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The Federal Election Commission  
as Regulator: The Changing Evaluations  
of Advisory Opinions 
Michael M. Franz* 
Federal election laws are dynamic and sensitive to how statutes and 
regulations are changed by Congress and interpreted by the courts and the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC). As such, political actors learn 
about permissible campaign strategies in an evolving regulatory context. 
This Article focuses on the relationship between the political actors charged 
with conforming to campaign finance laws and the chief regulator of such 
laws, the FEC. I examine over 1500 Advisory Opinion (AO) requests 
to the FEC between 1977 and 2012. AOs are specific requests to the 
FEC about the permissibility of proposed campaign activity. We can draw 
a number of important insights about the regulatory context from an 
examination of these AOs. First, we learn about the types of questions 
put forth by various political actors, which highlight areas of the law with 
some ambiguity. Second, we learn how the six commissioners interpret the 
law, and whether they do so with consensus or conflict. For decades, FEC 
commissioners interpreted the law with a great deal of consensus. More 
recently, however, the commissioners have conflicted at a much higher rate, 
often to the point of being unable to offer clear advice to political actors. 
The Article explores how these different periods inform an overall 
evaluation of the FEC as chief regulator. 
  
 
* Associate Professor of Government and Legal Studies, Bowdoin College. Special thanks to Kristina 
Dahmann, Jordan Goldberg, and Husam Abdalla for their careful coding during many aspects of this 
project. Kristina in particular not only coded opinions over the course of one summer, but she read 
the draft more closely than I ever expected. She also offered first-rate feedback. She completed her 
law school education in 2013, and she is poised to become an exceptional lawyer. I also thank Daniel 
Lowenstein and Richard Briffault for reading an earlier version of the Article and providing insightful 
feedback. Their expertise helped move this Article in a better direction. 
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I. THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION AS REGULATOR:  
THE CHANGING EVALUATIONS OF ADVISORY OPINIONS 
In 1992, the National Rifle Association (NRA) formally requested from the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) an Advisory Opinion (AO) on how to pay 
for a number of advertisements set to air in the coming election campaign.1 AOs 
are responses to specific requests to the FEC about the permissibility of proposed 
campaign activity. One proposed NRA radio ad was described as follows (quoting 
from AO 1992-23): 
[The ad] depicts a “Jeopardy” style quiz show in which the correct 
answer to each question asked during the ad is “Who is Congressman 
Beryl Anthony?” The categories used are “Exotic Locations,” 
“Outlandish Pay Raises,” and “Out of Touch.” The “questions” used for 
each category are, respectively: (a) “He’s spent over $35,000 of the 
taxpayers’ money to travel to Switzerland, Thailand, Hong Kong, 
Australia and other exotic locations.” (b) “He’s voted to give himself a 
pay raise five times and now earns over $129,000 per year paid for by the 
taxpayers.” (c) “He voted for a New York City style gun ban even though 
he claims to be a representative from Arkansas.” After each correct 
answer is given, “Groans and Moans” are heard from the audience.2 
The NRA initially planned to pay for the ads out of its hard money political action 
committee (PAC),3 but it asked the FEC whether the absence of “express 
 
1. Request by National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund at 1, FEC Advisory Op. No. 
1992-23 (June 1, 1991), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1083260.pdf. 
2. FEC Advisory Op. No. 1992-23, at 2 (1992), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/ 
1992-23.pdf. 
3. “Hard” money is money raised and spent under federal campaign finance laws. This is 
money spent with the goal of electing or defeating a federal candidate. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 
THIRTY YEAR REPORT 19 (2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/info/publications/30year.pdf. 
“Soft” money commonly refers to money raised and spent without limit for advocating on behalf of 
public policies or nonfederal candidates. See id. at 7. A political action committee (PAC) is an interest 
group that uses hard money for candidate contributions or pro-candidate electioneering. See id. at 4–5. 
A longer treatment of campaign finance laws is beyond the scope of this Article, but for such a 
discussion, see Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of Campaign Finance Law, in THE NEW 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 7, 7–47 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2005). 
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advocacy” messages in the proposed ads—ones asking people to vote against 
Congressman Anthony—meant that the ad could be considered “issue advocacy” 
and therefore paid for with corporate treasury funds.4 
The FEC responded that all of the proposed ads were “express advocacy” 
messages, despite the absence of so-called “magic words” in the ads.5 Writing for 
the FEC, FEC Chairwoman Joan Aikens (a Republican) noted in the AO:  
[T]he content and timing of these advertisements lead us to determine 
that they expressly advocate the election or defeat of a Federal candidate. 
All of the sample advertisements were run in close proximity to 
Congressman Anthony’s election. . . . These ads encourage no action in 
connection with the issues mentioned (such as urging the Congressman 
to vote for or against specific bills).6 
The single vote on the only draft AO considered by the FEC was 6–0.7 
Twenty years later, in AO 2012-11, Free Speech—an unincorporated non-
profit association—asked the FEC if its proposed print, radio, television, and 
online advertisements would be considered “issue advocacy,” exempting the 
group from registering with the FEC and thus reporting its receipts and 
expenditures.8 The FEC issued its AO after two deadlocked votes and two 
separate commissioner “statements.”9 The final AO, however, offered mixed 
 
4. See Request by National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund, supra note 1, at 1. 
5. FEC Advisory Op. No. 1992-23, supra note 2, at 4–5. These “magic words” are: “vote for, 
elect, support, cast your ballot for, Smith for Congress, vote against, defeat, [and] reject.” Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). The legal line between 
political/express and issue advocacy was mixed at the time of the 1992 AO (and really still is). When 
the NRA asked for feedback, some prior legal decisions had pointed to the magic word distinction as 
a possible bright line. See, e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249–51 (1986) 
(finding express advocacy absent Buckley’s magic words where material amounts to an explicit 
directive). But see FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 864–65 (9th Cir. 1987) (suggesting factors beyond 
these magic words could be used in the advocacy determination). 
6. FEC Advisory Op. No. 1992-23, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
7. Vote, FEC Advisory Op. No. 1992-23 (Aug. 10, 1992), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/ 
aodocs/1083262.pdf. 
8. See FEC Advisory Op. No. 2012-11, at 1–3 (2012), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/ 
aodocs/AO%202012-11.pdf. By 2012, the ability of interest groups to fund both express and issue 
advocacy with unlimited contributions without regard to source had been established with Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). Still, Free Speech wanted: 
[T]o speak publicly without being subject to the lengthy and complicated regulations 
overseen by the FEC. The Commission's extensive regulations concerning speech about 
candidates and political issues severely hamper the ability of grassroots groups to exercise 
their protected First Amendment rights. Whether through the difficult-to-comply-with 
“political committee status” or the never-understood-and-never-explained “express 
advocacy” standard, the FEC's regulations effectively mute Free Speech from speaking 
publicly unless clear guidance and boundaries are established. 
Request by Free Speech at 4, FEC Advisory Op. No. 2012-11 (Feb. 29, 2012), available at 
http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1204965.pdf. 
9. Vote, FEC Advisory Op. No. 2012-11 (Apr. 26, 2012), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/ 
aodocs/1208012.pdf; Caroline C. Hunter et al., Statement on Advisory Opinion 2012-11 (Free 
Speech), (May 9, 2012), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1209339.pdf; Concurring 
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guidance. The commissioners agreed that some of the proposed ads were “express 
advocacy,” but they disagreed and deadlocked on a number of other political 
ads,10 including the following, the text of which read “[a]cross America, millions 
of citizens remain uninformed about the truth of President Obama. Obama, a 
President who palled around with Bill Ayers. Obama, a President who was cozy 
with ACORN. Obama, a President destructive of our natural rights. Real voters 
vote on principle. Remember this nation’s principles.”11 The commissioners 
deadlocked also on whether the activities of the group required Free Speech to 
register with the FEC as a political committee.12 
The outcomes in AOs 1992-23 and 2012-11 point to complex developments 
in federal election law over the intervening twenty year period regarding “express” 
and “issue” advocacy. Indeed, much had changed between 1992 and 2012. In the 
1992 AO, the FEC reached bipartisan consensus to define the law in broad ways 
relative to interest groups and their advertisements. The timing of the ad was 
considered, for example, along with its perceived intended effect on voters.13 
Moreover, the AO was issued at a time when such questions were not really a 
major issue in American elections.14 By 2012, commissioners understood the law 
 
Opinion of Ellen L. Weintraub, Vice Chair, and Commissioners Cynthia L. Bauerly & Steven T. 
Walther in Advisory Opinion 2012-11 (Free Speech), (May 9, 2012), available at http:// 
saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1209340.pdf. A deadlock is when the FEC does not get four of six 
commissioners to approve an action. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(c) (2012) (outlining the need for the vote of 
four members of the FEC in order to take action). A commissioner will sometimes issue a concurring 
or dissenting statement alongside any official FEC actions. 
10. See Vote, supra note 9 (reporting a deadlock vote on adopting either Draft B or C of FEC 
Advisory Op. No. 2012-11). Compare Draft B of Advisory Op. No. 2012-11, at 8–9, 9–10, 13–14, 
available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1206386.pdf, and Draft C of Advisory Op. No. 2012-11, 
at 26–28, 29, 30–31, available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1207876.pdf (both drafts agree that 
some advertisements constitute express advocacy; see sections “‘Financial Reform’ Radio and 
Newspaper Advertisements,” “‘Health Care Crisis’ Radio and Newspaper Advertisements,” “‘Gun 
Control’ Facebook Advertisement,” and “‘Ethics’ Television Advertisement”), with Draft B of 
Advisory Op. No. 2012-11, at 6–8, 10–11, 11–13, 14–15, 15–16, available at http://saos.nictusa.com/ 
aodocs/1206386.pdf, and Draft C of Advisory Op. No. 2012-11, at 26, 29, 29–30, 32, 32–33, available 
at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1207876.pdf (on the other hand, the drafts disagree on whether 
other advertisements constitute express advocacy; see sections “‘Environmental Policy’ Radio 
Advertisement,” “‘Environmental Policy’ Facebook Advertisement,” “‘Gun Control’ Television 
Advertisement,” “‘Budget Reform’ Television Advertisement”, and “‘Educated Voter’ Television 
Advertisement”). 
11. FEC Advisory Op. No. 2012-11, supra note 8, at 8–9. 
12. Compare Draft B, supra note 10, at 21–27 (finding that Free Speech would need to register 
as a PAC) with Draft C, supra note 10, at 43–55 (finding that Free Speech would not need to register 
as a PAC). 
13. FEC Advisory Op. No. 1992-23, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
14. Indeed, from the time Congress reformed campaign finance laws in the 1970s to the 
middle of the 1990s, it seems that most federal electioneering by interest groups was funded through 
PACs with regulated contributions. For a variety of reasons, this changed in the 1990s, when 
“loopholes” in the law allowed both interest groups (beyond PACs) and political parties to raise and 
spend soft money for federal elections. These developments are explored in MICHAEL M. FRANZ, 
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very differently. To say that “real voters vote on principle” and that viewers 
should “[r]emember this nation’s principles”15 would seem to suggest a particular 
behavior in the ballot box. It is arguably more explicit than the NRA ad from the 
1992 AO. And yet, the commissioners could not reach agreement (one way or the 
other). This was made more relevant by the incredible growth in spending by 
outside groups in federal elections in 2012.16 
What explains the shift from a unanimous vote in 1992 to a deadlocked one 
on a very similar question twenty years later? The answer is not clear, though a 
number of political and legal trends provide some traction. One could point, for 
example, to a political environment in Washington more polarized and partisan 
than any in recent memory.17 Such an environment may have affected the types of 
commissioners appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The FEC 
was established in 197518 and is comprised of three Democratic and three 
Republican commissioners.19 Any action to move forward requires four votes.20 
Republican commissioners may see their role now as less about implementing the 
broader will of Congress (in spite of their own view of the law) and more about 
limiting the law’s application for any question not explicitly covered in the statute. 
Democratic commissioners may have mobilized in opposition to ward off the 
perceived erosion of existing regulations by Republican commissioners. This has 
happened alongside complex developments in the courts, which have made broad 
interpretations of the law, ones consistent with the 1992 NRA AO for example, 
less acceptable.21 Tracing these developments is beyond the scope of this Article, 
but decisions such as Citizens United v. FEC22 have inspired a vigorous debate 
about what limits there should be on the way interest groups advocate for federal 
candidates.23 
 
CHOICES AND CHANGES: INTEREST GROUPS IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 22–29, 39–49, 95–117 
(2008). 
15. FEC Advisory Op. No. 2012-11, supra note 8, at 9. 
16. See Michael M. Franz, Interest Groups in the Electoral Process: 2012 in Context, 10 FORUM 62, 
62 (2013).  
17. See generally NOLAN M. MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (Nolan McCarty et al. eds., 2006) (examining how 
increasing political polarization in recent decades has accompanied social and economic changes). 
18. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 410,  
88 Stat. 1263, 1304 (1974).  
19. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (2012). 
20. Id. § 437c(c). 
21. Such “broad interpretations” would include any attempts to resolve ambiguity in 
campaign finance laws on the side of tougher restrictions on how money can be raised and spent. See, 
e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2811–12, 2817–20, 
2823–26, 2328–29 (2011); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 452–54, 457 (2007). 
22. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
23. See generally S. 2219, The Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act  
of 2012 (DISCLOSE Act of 2012): Hearing on S. 2219 Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th 
Cong. (2012), http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/?a=files.serve&file_id=9b559943-7e01-48d6-a3 
fe-0344ec3b6412 (discussing potential legislation requiring that interest groups disclose their major 
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Indeed, the FEC is often at the center of complex legal debates, ones 
ranging from the limits placed on parties and interest groups in their 
electioneering to the application of existing regulations on emerging technologies. 
These questions are raised also amidst changing political and legal environments. 
Consequently, the job of the FEC is not an easy one. 
To investigate the FEC as chief regulator of federal campaign finance laws, 
this Article examines over 1500 AO requests to the FEC between 1977 and 2012. 
One can draw a number of important insights about the regulatory context from 
an examination of said AOs. First, we learn about the types of questions put forth 
by various political actors, which highlight areas of the law with some 
indistinctness. Second, we learn how the six commissioners interpret the law, and 
whether they do so with consensus or conflict. We can also trace the level of such 
conflict across time. This second question is of utmost importance, as it addresses 
the issue of how successfully commissioners can administer and enforce election 
law.24 Many argue that the FEC is a flawed agency, and there are consistent calls 
for an alternative regulatory model.25 The analysis here offers some insight on the 
efficacy of such a change. 
II. WHAT ARE ADVISORY OPINIONS? 
AOs are responses to specific requests to the FEC about the permissibility 
of proposed campaign activity.26 The powers and responsibilities of the FEC 
relative to AOs are laid out in 2 U.S.C. § 437(f), which includes a ten-day 
comment period on draft AOs under consideration and a sixty-day limit on the 
time between a request and an issued AO.27 The importance of FEC-issued AOs 
extends beyond the specific circumstances of the request but implicates also the 
actions of other political actors who may seek to behave in similar ways. AOs act 
 
funders in their electioneering activities); Are Super PACs Harming U.S. Politics?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/are-super-pacs-harming-us-politics (compiling commen-
tary of authors in favor of and against limits on interest group spending after Citizens United) (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
24. This Article does not consider FEC actions on enforcement and/or rule making. There is 
some empirical work on the former, but not as much the latter. See, e.g., Michael M. Franz, The Devil 
We Know? Evaluating the Federal Election Commission as Enforcer, 8 ELECTION L.J. 167, 173–85 (2009) 
(investigating FEC-released enforcement data between 1996 and 2004 for bias and effectiveness); 
Todd Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff: Third-Party Monitoring and FEC Enforcement Actions, 2 REG. & 
GOVERNANCE 216, 221–31 (2008) (examining patterns of FEC sanction strategies and their 
effectiveness); Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the Enforcement of Campaign Finance 
Laws, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1891, 1905–27 (1999) (discussing and evaluating the means by which the FEC 
enforces election laws). 
25. See, e.g., Todd Lochner, Overdeterrence, Underdeterrence, and a (Half-Hearted) Call for a Scarlet 
Letter Approach to Deterring Campaign Finance Violations, 2 ELECTION L.J. 23, 24, 31–36 (2003) 
(suggesting new sanctioning methods to improve FEC enforcement of election laws). 
26. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 3, at 10. 
27. If a request is made within sixty days of an election, the FEC must respond within twenty 
days. 2 U.S.C. § 437f(a)(2) (2012). 
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then as “signals” to the political community about how the law is interpreted by 
the six sitting commissioners. 
Commissioner Caroline Hunter made this point clear in her dissenting 
statement in 2010-19, which concerned disclaimer requirements for “text ads” 
generated by Google searches.28 Hunter believed the issued AO did not offer clear 
guidance to other political actors in similar circumstances. She wrote: 
[T]he Commission’s advisory opinions are not limited in their application 
only to the specific requester, but to all other parties who are similarly 
situated. Were AOs so limited in their effect, the [Federal Election 
Campaign] Act would not provide for a ten-day comment period on all 
AO requests for “any interested party.” Nor would the Commission 
provide for another opportunity for the public to comment on draft 
responses to advisory opinion requests. 
  Obviously, the Act and agency procedures provide for public 
comment because the conclusions the Commission reaches in any AO 
usually have broader application to the general public. Moreover, this 
understanding of the role of advisory opinions is not merely academic. In 
practice, experienced campaign finance professionals also believe that 
AOs apply to more than only the specific requesters.29 
As such, AOs are important in establishing both the kinds of campaign activities 
that political actors might see as falling in some gray area of existing law but also 
the orientation of the FEC to these gray areas. In short, these AOs have wide-
ranging applications and meaning. 
AOs and relevant supplementary documentation are available from the 
FEC’s website.30 All of the AOs between 1977 and 2012 were downloaded for 
this analysis.31 Coders relied on a coding sheet that captured among other factors, 
the requestor’s identity (i.e., candidate, party, or interest group), the purpose of the 
request, the length of the final letter from the FEC, all recorded votes on the 
approved AO after 1989, the number of other AOs cited by the FEC in offering 
its opinion, and the final FEC AO (i.e., did the FEC approve or deny the 
request).32 
 
28. Statement for the Record by Commissioner Caroline C. Hunter in Advisory Opinion 
2010-19 (Google), (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1158399.pdf. 
29. Id. at 2 (footnotes omitted). A similar defense of the “signal” notion of AOs appears in 
Concurring Opinion of Scott E. Thomas, Chairman, & Danny Lee McDonald, Commissioner, FEC 
Advisory Op. No. 1999-11, at 2–4 (1999), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1006875.pdf. 
30. FEC Advisory Opinion Search System, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://saos.nictusa.com/ 
saos/searchao (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
31. As of this writing, FEC Advisory Op. No. 2012-35 (2012), available at http://saos.nictusa 
.com/aodocs/AO%202012-35.pdf, was the last coded AO. 
32. The coded data and code sheet are available from the author on request.  
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Figure 1 shows the number of issued AOs through 2012.33 In the earliest 
days after the passage of amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act in 
1974,34 the FEC issued between 60 and 120 AOs each year.35 That number has 
steadily declined to around twenty-five over the course of the last five to eight 
years. In no year since 1996 has the FEC issued more than forty AOs. 
On the other hand, issued AOs have become more complex. Figure 2 plots 
the average length of issued AOs in each year between 1977 and 2012. An issued 
AO amounts to a letter from the FEC to the requester reviewing the questions 
posed and offering guidance on whether the proposed activities are permissible 
and on what grounds. In the early days of issued AOs, the average length of an 
AO was between 750 and 1000 words. AO length increased steadily through 2003 
when the average AO was over 2500 words. The average length dropped slightly 
in 2004 after passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) in 2002.36 
Mean length increased again, though, to over 2600 words in 2012. 
One interpretation of this increased length is a change in the style of issued 
AOs, from a cursory review of requestors’ questions to a much lengthier summary 
of proposed questions. This style change likely accounts for some of the increase, 
as commissioners have come to draft AOs that can be read and understood by 
other political actors (in light of their “signal” quality noted by Commissioner 
Hunter above). Another interpretation, however, is that more recent requested 
AOs tread into areas where the law is unclear, but where there is either some 
judicial precedent or related AOs with slightly different circumstances. Consider 
questions of new technologies. As these develop and offer new chances to raise 
funds or reach voters (e.g., through text messaging), prior court decisions and/or 
AOs on other technologies (e.g., soliciting funds through web sites) might provide 
some guidance, but still leave the legality of new practices open to question. This 
requires the FEC to traverse more history and to provide more thorough legal 
justification in its interpretation, which in turn lengthens its issued letter. 
An additional way to assess this change in length is to look at the average 
number of AOs cited by the FEC in its issued AOs. Figure 3 does this for each 
year between 1977 and 2012, and it illustrates a pattern of increased citations 
through 2002, when the average AO cited about seven related requests. In 2003 
 
33. An earlier analysis of mine reviewed the process of coding AOs between 1977 and 2003, 
and the analysis in the section that follows updates some of the trends noted there. FRANZ, supra note 
14, at 145–70. 
34. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(1974). 
35. This figure does not include any requests for AOs that were withdrawn before the FEC 
could issue guidance, or any AOs not issued because of a deadlock. 
36. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2003), 
invalidated in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). This was the first major reform of 
federal campaign finance laws since 1976. The new law prevented parties from raising and spending 
soft money and limited how interest groups could spend soft money close to an election. Id. 
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the number of cited AOs drops—likely the consequence of “uncharted territory” 
with the changes in BCRA—but by 2012, AOs again cited about five AOs on 
average. This increase suggests that AOs have changed not only in style, but 
reflect a longer history relating to new and innovative requests. Many proposed 
political actions are simply more complicated given the context of forty years of 
campaign finance law and jurisprudence. 
One particular value in the trends noted in Figure 3 is the interrelatedness of 
many AOs, which implies that questions posed by requestors are not often 
isolated matters on arcane sections of campaign finance law (which would devalue 
any academic focus on them). They instead often concern real areas of legal 
uncertainty, ones with implications for other substantive and related questions.37 
All told, these trends suggest a fount of data on areas of confusion in the law, in 
addition to ample opportunity to establish areas of conflict at the FEC on 
interpretations. 
 
Figure 1: Issued Advisory Opinions per Year38 
 
 
 
 
 
37. Figure 3 also implies a related visual mapping that might be useful. A network graph 
where each cited AO is mapped onto a two-dimensional space, and where AOs that cite that AO are 
placed close to it on the space, would establish the various cluster of related AOs. A graph of this sort 
is available from the author on request. 
38. Source: Federal Election Commission. Note: Totals do not include withdrawn or 
deadlocked requests. 
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Figure 2: Average Advisory Opinion Length per Year39 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Average Number of Cited Advisory Opinions per Year40 
 
 
 
39. Source: Federal Election Commission and author coding. Note: Fitted line is bivariate 
linear regression. 
40. Source: Federal Election Commission and author coding. Note: Fitted lines are bivariate 
linear regression and five-year moving average. 
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III. ANALYSIS: WHAT DO ADVISORY OPINIONS REVEAL ABOUT THE LAW? 
One value in looking at AOs is seeing what sorts of questions are common 
and how this varies across time. Coders for this project assessed each AO on up 
to five areas. They used a list of fifty-two content codes, assessed from reading a 
sample of AOs across the thirty-five year period under consideration. The 
categories range from the broad (e.g., a question concerning how to make or 
receive contributions) to the more specific (e.g., a question on whether an 
organization meets the requirements of being a media outlet, exempting it from 
campaign finance laws). 
Table 1 splits AOs into three time periods: 1977–1989; 1990–1999; 2000–
2012. It aggregates the number of AOs that reference each content area and 
reports the top fifteen areas for each time period. The reported percentages refer 
to the total number of issued AOs that focused on those top fifteen areas. 
Underlined entries are ones mentioned only in that time period, meaning all others 
were in the top fifteen for at least two time periods. 
 
Table 1: Focus of Advisory Opinions41 
 
Question About . . . Number  
of Mentions
Percent 
of Total 
1977–1989 (Time Period 1) 
Contributions (made or received) 244 31.94% 
Solicitation of funds 139 18.19% 
Filing obligations (i.e., what is reportable) 78 10.21% 
Use of funds (i.e., campaign funds) 64 8.38% 
Committee designation (i.e., must group register) 62 8.12% 
Handling of debts 57 7.46% 
Issue advocacy/express advocacy/GOTV 54 7.07% 
Definition of restricted class 51 6.68% 
Fund transfers 48 6.28% 
Affiliation between committees 46 6.02% 
Fund-raising 42 5.50% 
Use of excess campaign funds 42 5.50% 
Rules on funding or running ads 35 4.58% 
Committee organization (i.e., name of group) 30 3.93% 
Permissible campaign activity 30 3.93% 
Number of decided AOs 764
 
 
41. Percentages do not add up to 100 because AOs are coded on up to five categories. 
Underlined entries are ones only mentioned in top fifteen in one time period. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Question About . . . Number 
of Mentions
Percent 
of Total 
1990–1999 (Time Period 2) 
Contributions (made or received) 66 18.59% 
Solicitation of funds 58 16.34% 
Committee designation (i.e., must group register) 39 10.99% 
Use of funds (i.e., campaign funds) 39 10.99% 
Filing obligations (i.e., what is reportable) 38 10.70% 
Affiliation between committees 33 9.30% 
Use of soft money 30 8.45% 
Definition of membership 27 7.61% 
Issue advocacy/express advocacy/GOTV 26 7.32% 
Use of excess campaign funds 26 7.32% 
Fund raising 25 7.04% 
Definition of restricted class 21 5.92% 
Loans 17 4.79% 
Committee organization (i.e., name of group) 15 4.23% 
Fund transfers 14 3.94% 
Number of decided AOs 355
2000–2012 (Time Period 3) 
Contributions (made or received) 70 20.59% 
Use of funds (i.e., campaign funds) 53 15.59% 
Solicitation of funs 52 15.29% 
Committee designation (i.e., must group register) 41 12.06% 
Use of soft money 36 10.59% 
Internet 35 10.29% 
Fund raising 28 8.24% 
Affiliation between committees 27 7.94% 
Filing obligations (i.e., what is reportable) 24 7.06% 
Definition of restricted class 22 6.47% 
Bundling 22 6.47% 
Rules on funding or running ads 21 6.18% 
Issue advocacy/express advocacy/GOTV 20 5.88% 
Rules for 527s and 501c groups 19 5.59% 
Definition of “personal use” for funds 19 5.59% 
Number of decided AOs 340
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The results demonstrate considerable consistency across time, with some 
notable exceptions. Questions about how PACs, candidates, and parties can make 
and receive regulated contributions are at the top of the list, involving thirty-two 
percent of AOs in the 1977 to 1989 period and about twenty percent thereafter. 
Because making and receiving contributions is highly regulated by federal 
campaign finance laws, it makes sense that requestors would ask a lot of questions 
about the permissibility of certain action in that regard. It is the number one issue 
mention across all three periods. However, it is worth noting its higher rate of 
mention in the earlier time period. This demonstrates that questions have 
diversified in subsequent years. Questions pertaining to the solicitation of 
regulated funds (i.e., can a PAC or candidate raise money in a particular way) are 
the second most often-cited questions, accounting for about fifteen to eighteen 
percent of all questions in each time period. 
One might also note the consistency of issue-advocacy-related questions in 
all three periods. About six to seven percent of all AOs in each time period refer 
to questions about the boundary between regulated express advocacy and 
protected issue-related speech.42 This is particularly important to note because 
such questions did not merely arise in the middle of the 1990s, roughly the time 
when their frequency vexed campaign finance reformers, but were at issue as far 
back as the late 1970s. The same is similarly true for party soft money requests, 
but that issue is not in the top fifteen mentions in time period 1 (though it is just 
outside the top twenty in time period 1, with nineteen requests).43 
Table 1 obviously hides a lot in the nature of AOs. This reflects the trade-off 
of studying these AOs qualitatively or quantitatively. Indeed, there are lots of 
interesting specifics in these AOs, from whether a candidate can raise funds with 
credit cards44 to whether someone can contribute via text message.45 Indeed, 
 
42. See Corrado, supra note 3, at 33 (describing the rise of issue-advocacy advertising designed 
to circumvent express-advocacy restrictions). 
43. Frequency of requests by issue need not be taken as an indicator of an AO’s relevance. 
For example, the party soft money requests of the late 1970s were monumental in providing the 
parties guidance on how to raise funds outside of federal regulations. See FEC Advisory Op. No. 
1978-10 (1978), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1978-10.pdf; see also FEC Advisory Op. 
No. 1978-09 (1978), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1978-09.pdf; FEC Advisory Op. 
No. 1978-50 (1978), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1978-50.pdf; FEC Advisory Op. No. 
1978-78 (1978), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1978-78.pdf. A useful AO-level metric 
might be the number of times an AO is cited by other AOs. For example, FEC Advisory Op. No. 
1978-09 has been referenced in twelve other AOs through 2012. See FEC Advisory Opinion Search 
System, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao (search “Go to AO 
number” for “1978-09”; then follow “Other AOs Citing to this AO” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 6, 
2013) (listing FEC Advisory Op. Nos. 1978-50, 1978-89, 1982-17, 1982-38, 1983-15, 1988-33, 1991-
14, 1991-22, 1997-18, 1994-04, 2005-02, and 2008-06). 
44. See FEC Advisory Op. No. 1978-68 (1978), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/ 
1978-68.pdf. 
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many AOs raise novel questions about the applicability of campaign finance laws, 
questions that Congress could never have imagined when drafting the law in the 
1970s. AOs subsequently put the FEC in the middle of a range of thorny legal 
questions. 
 
Table 2: Identity of Requestors 
 
Sponsor 
Number  
of Requests 
Percent 
of Total
1977–1989     
Candidate 333 43.64%
Party 61 7.99%
Interest group 354 46.40%
Other 15 1.97%
1990–1999     
Candidate 130 36.72%
Party 59 16.67%
Interest group 157 44.35%
Other 8 2.26%
2000–2012     
Candidate 104 30.77%
Party 63 18.64%
Interest group 152 44.97%
Other 19 5.62%
Note: “Other” in this table refers to a request from an 
individual or a mix of the above requestors. 
 
Another useful pattern concerns requestor identity. Who is making the bulk 
of requests over time, and has that frequency changed? Table 2 uses the same time 
periods, but shows the frequency of requestor sponsorship. Between 1977 and 
1989, candidates and interest groups accounted for forty-four and forty-six 
percent of all requests, respectively. Since the 1980s, however, candidate share of 
requests have declined to thirty-seven percent in time period 2 and thirty-one 
percent since 2000. Party requests have jumped from eight percent to seventeen 
percent (time period 2) and nineteen percent (time period 3). This shift in 
requestors is likely driven by the changes in campaign finance laws. The rules for 
 
45. See FEC Advisory Op. No. 2012-26 (2012), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/ 
AO%202012-26.pdf; FEC Advisory Op. No. 2012-28 (2012), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/ 
aodocs/AO%202012-28.pdf. 
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candidates have not changed much since 1974, in the sense that contribution 
limits and reporting requirements have been a constant. On the other hand, the 
rules for parties have changed a lot in the last thirty years (the consequence of a 
series of congressional actions and judicial decisions), and the boundary for 
interest groups between regulated and unregulated behavior has consistently been 
at issue.46 
IV. ANALYSIS: WHAT DO ADVISORY OPINIONS REVEAL  
ABOUT THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION? 
Patterns in AO focus and requestor identity are important in tracking 
ambiguities in the law, but ultimately many question the value in preserving the 
current structure of the FEC. Changing the FEC structure is a common 
recommendation of many seeking more aggressive campaign finance laws.47 What 
do AOs reveal about the nature of the FEC as a regulatory agency? 
This is a hard question to answer, in no small part because of the complexity 
of many campaign-finance-related questions and the diversity of perspective on 
how to interpret the law. Nonetheless, one purpose of the six-member bipartisan 
FEC is to demand some cross partisan cooperation. Because the law requires four 
votes to act,48 three-to-three deadlocks are an indication of an inability to offer 
advice on the nature of the law. Indeed, the question of what a three-to-three vote 
means is more than academic. Does it imply an allowance for any proposed 
activity, largely because the FEC was unable to say “no”? Or is it a “non-opinion” 
that preserves the legal ambiguity?49 
One thing we can be sure of is that FEC AOs issued with limited dissent 
across partisan lines are a sign of a functional agency. How often do we see such 
behavior, though? Is there a change in the content of FEC votes? The FEC’s 
extensive archive of issued AOs includes recorded votes on all AOs back to 
1990.50 I collected each recorded vote, and Figure 4 aggregates by year the number 
of yes and no votes on all issued AOs back to 1990. It consequently shows the 
 
46. The changes for parties include the ability to raise and spend soft money and the ability to 
use hard money to advocate independently for candidates. For a review of these changes, see 
Anthony Corrado, Party Finance in the Wake of BCRA: An Overview, in THE ELECTION AFTER 
REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT 19, 22, 30–31 (Michael 
J. Malbin ed., 2006). For a review of changes for interest groups, see MARK J. ROZELL, CLYDE 
WILCOX & MICHAEL M. FRANZ, INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN CAMPAIGNS: THE NEW FACE 
OF ELECTIONEERING 60–67 (3d ed. 2012). 
47. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Finance Rules: A System in Search of Reform,  
9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 279, 286–90 (1991); John McCain, Reclaiming Our Democracy: The Way 
Forward, 3 ELECTION L.J. 115, 118–20 (2004).  
48. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(c) (2012). 
49. The answer to these questions is actually unclear.  
50. FEC Advisory Opinion Search System, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://saos.nictusa.com/ 
saos/searchao (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
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percentage of all recorded votes that are dissensions. Figure 5 shows the 
percentage of votes that are unanimous.51 
The trends in both figures point to important developments. In Figure 4, the 
percentage of votes that were dissensions only exceeded ten percent once prior to 
2003, but has only been below ten percent in three years since. The five-year 
moving average demonstrates a consistent increase in overall dissensions since 
2000, such that by 2012 nearly one-quarter of all votes were no votes. In total, 
between 1990 and 2005 the percentage of dissensions was eight percent of all 
votes. The number is just under eighteen percent since 2006—a more than one 
hundred percent relative jump. In Figure 5, the trend in unanimous votes on AOs 
is also suggestive. Between 1990 and 2005 the average percentage of votes in any 
year that were unanimous was seventy-six percent. Since then, the number has 
dropped to just fifty-five percent.52 
One weakness in these data is the absence of votes prior to 1990, which the 
FEC has not yet posted to its site. Another metric that provides more coverage, 
then, is the percentage of AOs in each year that deadlock. For this, we need not 
have the recorded votes but the final AO itself, which in the case of a deadlock 
reports to the requestor that the FEC could not reach the required four votes for 
action. This is reported in Figure 6 for the entire period back to 1977. But for 
1989 and 1994, the percentage of AO requests that deadlock never exceeded six 
percent before 2006. Since 2006, however, deadlocks have only dropped below six 
percent in one year, 2008. And in three of the last four years, the FEC has 
deadlocked on more than ten percent of requests, including nearly twenty percent 
in 2012. In total, between 1977 and 2012, the FEC has deadlocked on 55 of over 
1500 AOs, which is 3.7 percent. The jump in recent years, then, is a dramatic one. 
It is important again to reiterate the challenges of studying these issues 
quantitatively; such analyses miss the nuance in specific cases. Fifty-five deadlocks 
may not seem like a lot in the context of over 1,500, but each AO is not equal in 
its importance or reach. The Appendix lists the fifty-five deadlock AOs along with 
 
51. At some points in the FEC’s history there have been only five sitting commissioners, the 
consequence of a delay in Senate confirmations. Franz, supra note 24, at 176. Five-to-zero decisions in 
these instances are treated as unanimous. In making these calculations, only the percentage of AOs 
with zero dissents was counted. The number of absences or abstentions on each vote does not bear 
on the calculation. In other words, a 5-0-1 vote is counted as unanimous. If one re-conceptualizes the 
meaning of unanimity to include no dissensions, abstentions, or absences, one still finds a slight 
decline in unanimity in recent years. 
52. One might wonder only about the final vote to issue the AO. The final vote is on whether 
to send a particular draft to the requestor, which is what stands as the real test of whether the FEC 
can offer advice in a clear way. The trends outlined in Figures 4 and 5 hold if we restrict the analysis 
to just those final votes, though dissensions are a bit lower and unanimity is a bit higher. It should 
also be noted that there is really no trend in the average number of votes recorded on each AO by 
year. There appears to be a slight increase in the average number of votes since 2008 (between 1.3 
and 1.7), which followed a time of infrequent votes in the late 1990s; however, the average number of 
votes in the early 1990s resembles the more recent period. 
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identifiers for the sponsor and the focus. Fourteen requests have concerned 
candidates (twenty-five percent) while thirty-eight have involved interest groups 
(seventy percent). The clear balance, then, is to deadlock on what outside groups 
have proposed, but even among these, the focus of the requests ranges quite a 
bit.53 
Figure 4: Percent of All Votes that Are Dissents54 
 
 
 
 
  
 
53. Is there a way to measure the importance of AO requests to the larger political 
community? One metric is the number of external comments the FEC receives on various draft AOs. 
These are almost always conveyed to the FEC prior to any action taken by the commissioners and 
usually recommend a specific course of action (e.g., approve or deny a specific request; or approve or 
deny a particular draft AO). Fortunately, along with FEC votes on all AOs, the FEC makes public 
these formal communications. Again the data are limited to AOs back to 1990. I collected the 
number of unique communicators on each AO. These could be reform organizations (e.g., the Center 
for Responsive Politics), other candidates and parties, and sometimes even interested citizens. I cross 
tabulated the number of dissensions on the final vote for each AO with an indicator of whether the 
FEC received any formal communication from an interested party. On the 539 AOs that were issued 
unanimously, the FEC received external feedback on only eighty-nine (16.5%). On all others that 
involved at least one dissension, which amounts to 116 AOs, the FEC received at least one comment 
on fifty-eight of them (50%). This is clear evidence that the FEC conflicts more often on requests 
that have larger meaning to the broader political community. I thank Richard Briffault for suggesting 
this measure. 
54. Source: Federal Election Commission and author coding. Note: Fitted line is five-year 
moving average. 
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Figure 5: Percent of Votes that Were Unanimous55 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Percent Deadlocked Advisory Opinions per Year56 
 
 
 
55. Source: Federal Election Commission and author coding. Note: Fitted line is five-year 
moving average. 
56. Source: Federal Election Commission and author coding. Note: Fitted line is five-year 
moving average. 
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There is also the issue of the partisan nature of FEC voting. Are deadlocks 
partisan? Or do commissioners cross party lines at a nontrivial rate? Table 3 
shows a cross tabulation of dissents from Republican and Democratic 
commissioners. There is at least one dissent in over thirty percent of all AO votes 
since 1990, but of these, only 28 of 288 votes have involved any bipartisanship. 
Eleven of these involve one Democratic and one Republican dissension, while 
only five votes are deadlocks (three total dissensions) resulting from two 
commissioners of one party joining one of the other. (Twelve votes involve more 
than three dissensions.) Across all 953 recorded votes, 16.3% involve two or more 
commissioners of just one party dissenting. All of this suggests that FEC conflict 
lines up along partisan lines, although it should be noted of the 288 votes with any 
dissensions, 104 (eleven percent) involved only one dissenting commissioner. 
 
Table 3: Dissensions in Commission Voting by Party57 
 
 Republican Dissensions 
 0 1 2 3 Total 
D
em
oc
ra
tic
 D
iss
en
sio
ns
 0 665 47 30 35 777 
69.80% 4.90% 3.10% 3.70% 81.50% 
1 57 11 3 4 75 
6.00% 1.20% 0.30% 0.40% 7.90% 
2 47 2 0 7 56 
4.90% 0.20% 0.00% 0.70% 5.90% 
3 44 1 0 0 45 
4.60% 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 4.70% 
Total 813 61 33 46 953 
 85.30% 6.40% 3.50% 4.80% 100.00% 
Note: Votes are on any recorded action in all Advisory Opinions between 1990 and 
2012. 
 
To this point, the evidence clearly demonstrates increased conflict at the 
FEC, but there is still more data we can bring to bear on the matter. The trends 
noted refer to recorded votes, which make no mention to the actual advice given 
to requestors. Each AO was additionally coded on whether the FEC approved 
(coded as one) or denied (coded as negative one) the requested political activity.58 
To capture mixed AOs, a third category was assigned for AOs where the outcome 
is a mix of approval and denial (or as will be discussed below, approval and 
 
57. Source: Federal Election Commission and author coding. 
58. Deadlocks are not included here. These could be coded as losses, though. 
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deadlock)—this was coded as zero. Figure 7 aggregates those trends by year back 
to 1977. 
 
Figure 7: Mean Coded Outcome on Issued Advisory Opinions59 
 
 
 
Across all of the coded AOs—nearly 1500 in total—the FEC approved 
about sixty-six percent. They denied requests about fifteen percent of the time, 
and they provided mixed AOs in about sixteen percent of the requests. The trend 
in Figure 7, however, suggests three rough “time periods” of FEC decision 
making. In the early years of issued AOs, the FEC tended to offer a range of AOs, 
including its fair share of “no” AOs. The mean outcome on issued AOs through 
1989 was 0.40 on the 1 to 1 scale. Clearly the FEC was more likely to approve 
the request in all years, but in the first decade of this time series, the FEC was 
more critical than in later years.60 From 1990 to about 2005, however, the FEC 
issued “yes” AOs at a much higher frequency. The mean outcome by 2000 was 
about 0.70 on the three-point scale. Indeed, across all types of requests, the FEC 
at this time was far more permissive in what it approved. By 2012, however, that 
trend had reversed, and the FEC was offering a bit more mixed guidance on 
 
59. Source: Federal Election Commission and author coding. Note: Fitted lines are bivariate 
linear regression and five-year moving average. * 1 = loss; 0 = mix; 1 = win. 
60. One might also look for divergence in outcomes by sponsor. Even when accounting for 
requestor identity, the trends noted in Figure 7 are still evident. What does seem to be the case, 
though, is that approval rates tended to increase more strongly for groups and parties over time, while 
not increasing as starkly for candidates. 
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average. This is made evident by the dip in the moving average, such that by 2012 
the mean outcome was just over 0.50. 
It would be a mistake, however, to attribute this recent change to a more 
aggressive FEC bent on reining in innovative requests. Only a close reading of the 
AOs can make this clear, however. What coders discovered, and what was wholly 
foreign to issued AOs in the early years of this time series, was a tendency for the 
FEC to issue an AO on only part of the request and to deadlock on other 
questions posed. AO 2012-11, the Free Speech AO noted at the beginning of this 
Article, is a good example.61 In these cases, the FEC agrees to issue a formal AO, 
but notes that some of the questions were not resolved with the requisite four 
commissioner votes. Such AOs were coded as mixed outcomes. All told, 
seventeen of the fifty-five AOs with mixed outcomes since 2003 were those so 
coded because of a deadlock on part of the request. 
These more recent years, then, amount to a unique time period, where the 
FEC admits in many AOs that it could not reach agreement on part of its 
deliberations.62 Whereas the FEC before 1989 might be described as an aggressive 
regulator with the goal of stopping the development of many loopholes in election 
law, the FEC after 2006 is best characterized as conflicted and increasingly unable 
to offer clear and unidirectional advice. 
Consider the words of election lawyer, Bob Bauer, who reached this same 
conclusion in 2009, not from a deeply empirical look at the data but from his own 
detailed knowledge of FEC behavior: 
Republicans have not, as might be imagined, aspired to an emasculated 
agency. On the contrary, the Republican Party struck an alliance in the 
1970s with liberal Democrats to pursue an independent enforcement 
agency. Opposing them were old-line members like Democrat Wayne 
Hays, Chairman of the Rules Committee, who despised the very notion 
of the agency—and then the agency—without apology. Yet for 
Republicans, no reform accepted in the Watergate period of reforms was 
as important as an independent enforcement body. . . . 
  The split provided for by law in the Commissioner membership, 
limiting any one party to three seats, was proof that Congress was under 
no illusion that the agency would escape the temptations and pressures of 
partisanship. The law provided that each party could check the excesses 
of the other. But for many years, while partisanship was hardly absent 
from the agency’s deliberations or actions, voting patterns showed a 
 
61. FEC Advisory Op. No. 2012-11, supra note 8. 
62. See, e.g., FEC Advisory Op. No. 2012-11, supra note 8, at 1, 7, 10–11; FEC Advisory Op. 
No. 2012-19, at 1, 4 (2012), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/AO%202012-19.pdf; FEC 
Advisory Op. No. 2012-27, at 1, 3–7 (2012), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/AO 
%202012-27.pdf. 
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degree of bi-partisanship that would today count as something 
remarkable.63 
There is one final investigation worth noting. Knowing that conflict in FEC 
voting runs along the partisan divide (see again Table 3), is it possible that this 
partisanship also lines up with the party of the AO requestor? That is, are 
Democratic commissioners more likely to object when a Republican Party 
committee or candidate asks for advice? This is a bit harder to assess by looking 
just at votes, since votes on various drafts of AOs might be more or less favorable 
to the requestor. (The FEC often considers multiple draft AOs. Some versions 
may be more permissive or restrictive than others.) On the other hand, we can 
restrict the analysis to final votes on requests, where the coding noted earlier 
established the direction of the outcome (approval, denial, or mixed approval). A 
partisan pattern of voting would suggest that on votes to approve a request, 
commissioners of the other party would be more likely to object. And on votes to 
prevent action, these same commissioners would be less likely to object. Such 
patterns would be somewhat damaging evidence of a partisan bias in FEC voting 
patterns. 
Table 4 shows the breakdown for dissensions conditional on whether the 
dissents are from commissioners of the same or other party as the requestor. It 
also shows the breakdowns depending on whether the request was approved or 
faced some objection from the FEC. (Denials and mixed approvals are combined 
for this analysis.) The results suggest barely any evidence of a partisan pattern, 
however. On the one hand, commissioners of the same party as the requestor are 
less likely to object when an AO is approved. In 91.7% of these cases they all vote 
to approve, compared to 81.7% when the request is denied or given mixed 
approval. That is, objections are more common when the response is less than 
favorable for the requestor. But this pattern is almost identical for commissioners 
of the other party.64 
All told, commissioners of the same party as the requestor are only 3.6% 
more likely (91.7% to 88.1%) to unanimously approve of a request than 
commissioners of the other party. That seems hardy worth fretting about, though. 
Yes, dissensions and deadlocks are up, and all of this lines up along partisan lines. 
 
63. Robert F. Bauer, The Republican Commissioners and the Meaning of the Deadlocks at the FEC, 
MORE SOFT MONEY HARD L.: WEB UPDATES (May 18, 2009), http://www.moresoftmoneyhard 
law.com/news.html?aid=1452. Bauer no longer maintains the blog, but the full archive of posts is still 
available at the site. 
64. What if one restricts the analysis to final votes on deadlocked AOs for parties and 
candidates? As the Appendix shows, there are only fourteen such cases since 1990 (including the two 
jointly sponsored by an interest group). One of these involved a third party candidate. In five of the 
remaining twelve cases, the recorded vote is a unanimous one to close out the request. This means 
the FEC could not reach agreement but never formally recorded a deadlocked vote, making it 
difficult to establish the nature of the opposition among the commissioners. Seven of the others 
involved a partisan deadlock, and one involved a bipartisan deadlock. This is just not enough data to 
leverage a fair inference. 
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Those trends are concerning enough. But this final set of evidence is a breath of 
fresh air. Conflict seems more likely to be over principle—that seems a reasonable 
inference to draw from the data in Table 4, at least—over serving the partisan 
ends of the various requestors. 
 
Table 4: Dissensions in Commission Voting by Party  
of Commissioner and Requestor65 
 
 From Commissioners of 
Same Party  
From Commissioners of Other 
Party 
 Loss or Mixed 
Approval 
Win  Loss or Mixed 
Approval 
Win 
D
iss
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ns
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Fi
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0 67 177 66 170 
81.70% 91.70% 80.50% 88.10% 
1 10 12 12 18 
12.20% 6.20% 14.60% 9.30% 
2 5 4 4 5 
6.10% 2.10% 4.90% 2.60% 
Total 82 193 82 193 
   100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Note: Final votes for requests initiated by Democratic and Republican candidates or 
parties for Advisory Opinions between 1990 and 2012.
V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
What are observers of campaign finance laws and their enforcement to make 
of these results? Do they point to any particular deficiency and bias at the FEC? 
The answer depends on the emphasis one gives to the findings. On the one hand, 
a decline in unanimity at the FEC and an increase in deadlocks—not trends 
confined to AOs but to enforcement matters66—suggest a problem at the FEC 
that demands a solution. The relative consensus that once was an FEC norm has 
been shattered by an increase in deadlocks, no more visible than the all-time high 
in 2012. 
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report in 2009 on deadlocks at the 
FEC (authored by R. Sam Garrett) highlighted three courses of action for 
Congress: maintain the status quo, conduct oversight of FEC behavior (e.g., by 
putting pressure on FEC nominees to pay fealty to consensus building), or pursue 
legislative change in the structure of the FEC (e.g., changing from a six-member 
 
65. Source: Federal Election Commission and author coding. 
66. See Franz, supra note 24, at 176–77. 
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board to a three-member board).67 On the issue of legislative change, the CRS 
report noted that Congress could legislate specifically in the areas where FEC 
deadlocks are most common.68 On the other hand, as Garrett notes (and as the 
Appendix here shows) “legislating individual policy issues would not necessarily 
address the fact that the Commission deadlocked on a variety of issues, which 
suggests that structural reform could be more expedient route [sic] to curtailing 
deadlocked votes.”69 
Such structural reform brings its own set of challenges, however. Former 
FEC lawyer Stephen Hoersting had this to say about the question in an August 
2012 National Review article, which focused on FEC regulations defining 
coordination between an outside group and a candidate or party: 
Campaign-finance restrictions are designed to advance progressivism . . . . 
But those who would prefer an FEC structured to act more forcefully . . . 
should remember that an equally divided commission regulating politics 
is still better than an odd-numbered commission, and that no one who 
treasures open debate should want to see presidential campaigns 
regulated by an agency resembling today’s National Labor Relations 
Board [which has five members].70 
Hoersting points out that structural solutions aimed at more aggressive 
enforcement may not lead to an agency that gains the respect of campaign finance 
reformers, and it most certainly would raise the ire of conservative activists.71 
Putting aside the near impossibility of such structural change—given the 
opposition to the FEC among many senators72—the key issue is whether 
 
67. R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40779, DEADLOCKED VOTES AMONG 
MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (FEC): OVERVIEW AND POTENTIAL 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 13–15 (2009), available at http://congressional.proquest.com/ 
congressional/docview/t21.d22.crs-2009-gvf-0660 (last visited Mar. 30, 2013). Reducing the number 
of commissioners to an odd number will surely reduce deadlocks, but it does not end the possibility. 
Strategic abstentions or absences by commissioners may reduce the number of recorded votes on 
AOs and enforcement matters to an even number. The analysis of all recorded votes on AOs 
suggests this is a nontrivial matter. Twenty-nine percent of all votes since 1990 experienced some 
abstentions or absences by commissioners. On the other hand, of AOs with more than one 
abstention or absence, thirty-one of the forty-seven votes involved commissioners of both parties. 
68. Id. at 15.  
69. Id. 
70. Stephen M. Hoersting, Was ‘Understands’ Coordinated?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Aug. 16, 2012, 
4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/content/was-‘understands’-coordinated. The NLRB has 
no shortage of its critics, given its role in adjudicating labor-management issues in the private sector. 
It has also been criticized as being a tool of Democratic administrations and the political left. See, e.g., 
Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Member Resigns over Leak to G.O.P. Allies, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012, 
at B3. 
71. See Hoersting, supra note 70. 
72. See Josh Israel & Aaron Mehta, Withdrawn FEC Nominee Laments “Broken” Confirmation 
Process, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 7, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
2010/10/07/2450/withdrawn-fec-nominee-laments-broken-confirmation-process. 
2013] THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION AS REGULATOR 759 
 
structural change will reestablish the consensus previously evident in FEC 
proceedings. 
At the end of the day, the larger message may be that conflict at the FEC is 
merely another example of partisan polarization that has affected congressional 
behavior,73 judicial decision making,74 and even law clerk hiring patterns at the 
Supreme Court.75 And very few scholars and policy makers have designed 
workable pathways to reducing such polarization. In that vein, it might be useful 
to consider the FEC as more a reflection of the larger political culture than itself a 
cause of the dysfunction. Consider again the three periods suggested with Figure 
7. At the time the FEC was more critical of AO requests (pre-1990), congressional 
polarization was less severe and the flow of money in elections was not as 
intense.76 The FEC became more permissive in the 1990s at the same time that 
control of Congress became more uncertain and as the demand for money in 
elections intensified.77 In this time frame, the FEC as constituted could probably 
not have stemmed such a surge in demand for electoral cash—the electoral stakes 
between 1994 and 2000 were simply too high to both Democrats and 
Republicans. Finally, deadlocks gripped the FEC at the same time that 
polarization handicapped Congress. Indeed, it is hard to expect any bipartisan 
cooperation at a time when congressional leaders across the aisle are in such stark 
opposition. 
Arguing that the FEC reflects the larger culture does not absolve it of 
responsibility for the spike in deadlocks, however, but it does contextualize the 
patterns noted here. Garrett’s CRS report included the option to “maintain the 
status quo” at the FEC.78 There is much to appreciate in this. The FEC continues 
 
73. See Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 
152–56 (2012). 
74. See David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme Court, THE 
ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012, 10:29 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-
incredible-polarization-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155. 
75. See Adam Liptak, A Sign of the Court’s Polarization: Choice of Clerks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2010, at A1. 
76. See FRANZ, supra note 14, at 161–64 (determining, based on statistical analysis, that the 
FEC was less likely to approve interest group requests pre-1990 than it was in the late 1990s); 
MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 17, at 23–54 (showing evidence that congressional polarization became 
more severe during the 1990s). For the claim about a less intense flow of money, consider data 
located in the “Historical Elections” section of the Center for Responsive Politics website. Historical 
Elections, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/index.php (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2013). The amount of money spent in federal elections has steadily increased. Id. 
77. See FRANZ, supra note 14, at 36–39. 
78. R. SAM GARRETT, supra note 67, at 13. 
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to provide guidance in the vast majority of requested AOs, for example. And they 
still issue the majority of these decisions unanimously.79 
Still, one response to a more sanguine view of the FEC is that Republican 
commissioners are attempting to subvert the law with their votes on AOs, 
enforcement matters, and rule making. That is, there may less ambiguity in the law 
than Republican commissioners are asserting publicly, and they may be using AO 
requests to undermine congressional intent.80 This makes regulatory deficiency in 
this context particularly problematic given its relationship to the integrity of the 
electoral process. This may be true, though the efficacy of such a charge likely 
requires a case-by-case analysis of FEC decision making. Counting deadlocks is 
not enough to establish that Republican commissioners are railroading 
congressional intent. And even if this is a larger project motivated by a more 
conservative orthodoxy, Republican commissioners often release supporting 
statements in AOs that make clear the legal foundation for their dissensions.81 
There is another point worth remembering. Commissioners are appointed by 
the Senate and have been described as tools of incumbent legislators.82 To the 
extent that that is true, the appointing Senate deserves its share of the blame for 
any deficiency in the way the FEC functions. Indeed, the FEC operated in 2008 
without a quorum of four members, as the Senate stalled on replacing 
commissioners whose terms had expired.83 Much blame indeed can be levied at 
Congress for its oversight of the FEC. 
Still, structural change remains attractive to reformers. One might consider 
here the evidence from the states. The fifty states are both a good and bad place 
to look for comparisons. On the one hand, the states have remarkable diversity of 
enforcement mechanisms. For example, nineteen states assign enforcement of 
state campaign finance laws to the secretary of state (and his or her office), the 
attorney general, or some other single administrator.84 This makes these single 
 
79. Figure 5 showed the trends in unanimous voting on all recorded votes. If one restricts the 
analysis to the vote to issue an AO, unanimity is down from eighty percent prior to 2005 to about 
seventy percent thereafter. That is still a decline, but seventy percent remains a high number. 
80. Richard L. Hasen, The FEC Is as Good as Dead, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2011, 10:13 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/01/the_fec_is_as_good_as 
_dead.html.  
81. Donald F. McGahn, Reject the FEC’s Activist Overreach, POLITICO (July 14, 2009, 4:52 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/24874.html. 
82. See, e.g., William C. Oldaker, Of Philosophers, Foxes, and Finances: Can the Federal Election 
Commission Ever Do an Adequate Job?, 486 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 143 (1986). 
83. Eliza Newlin Carney, The Endless FEC Fight, NAT’L J. (June 16, 2008), http://www 
.nationaljournal.com/columns/rules-of-the-game/the-endless-fec-fight-20080616. 
84. These states are: AL, AZ, CO, DE, ID, MA, MI, MS, MT, ND, NH, NM, NV, OR, PA, 
SD, UT, VT, and WY. Information from the states comes from a comparison of state laws, accessed 
in part through the Campaign Disclosure Project’s website. The Campaign Disclosure Law Database, 
CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE PROJECT, http://disclosure.law.ucla.edu (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). For a 
comparison of states that assign enforcement of campaign finance laws to a particular agency, see id. 
(select in the dropdown under letter “Y” “1. What is the name of the regulatory agency or entity that 
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administrators the type of “top dog” enforcers that many in the reform 
community might want to see at the national level.85 Twenty-two states have 
enforcement and oversight commissions made up of an odd number of 
commissioners,86 which has the effect of reducing the likelihood of partisan 
stalemates in commissioner decision making. Only nine states have commissions 
comprised of an even number of members87—two states have four-member 
commissions,88 four have six members,89 and three have eight members.90 This 
simple comparison makes clear how the FEC is a structural outlier; its bipartsian 
six-member make-up is only mirrored in four states (Missouri, Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, and Iowa).91 
And the initial evidence in the evaluation of these different structures is 
telling. (A caveat on the analysis that follows. The state-level comparisons are on 
enforcement of state campaign finance infractions. This is not a clean comparison 
with the FEC AO process, which involves a pre-election evaluation of proposed 
action. Still, the analysis is instructive of the success or failure, more broadly, of 
alternative regulatory models.) In 2012, the Center for Public Integrity released a 
report on each state’s Corruption Risk.92 The state rankings used a variety of 
 
oversee campaign disclosure?”; then follow “select all” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). Not all 
states have information listed through this link, however. Nor does the site describe the structure of 
any agencies or commissions assigned the task of enforcement. I then searched for each state’s 
enforcement agency by visiting all state government websites to fill in any ambiguities or gaps in the 
information from the Campaign Disclosure Project. 
85. This statement is not exactly right. Some may hope for a single election law administrator 
whose sole function is administering and enforcing campaign finance laws. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, 
Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 937, 973 n.148 (2005). Only three states have such a person: DE, MT, and MA. For 
an explanation of how this data was collected, see supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
86. These states are: AK, AR, CA, CT, FL, GA, HI, KS, KY, LA, MD, ME, NC, NE, NJ, 
OH, OK, SC, TN, VA, WA, and WV. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
87. These states are: IA, IL, IN, MN, MO, NY, RI, TX, and WI. See supra note 85 and 
accompanying text. 
88. These states are: IN and NY. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
89. These states are: IA, MN, MO, and WI. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
90. These states are: IL, RI, and TX. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
91. Board Members, IOWA ETHICS & CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE BOARD., http://www.state 
.ia.us/government/iecdb/board/board_members.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2013); Board Members, 
MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BOARD., http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/Board 
Members.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2013); About the Missouri Election Commission, MO. ETHICS 
COMMISSION, http://www.mec.mo.gov/EthicsWeb/MecCommissioners.aspx#Section3 (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2013); Members of the Government Accountability Board, WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD., 
http://gab.wi.gov/about/members (last visited Feb. 9, 2013). 
92. State reports are located at the Center for Public Integrity’s State Integrity Investigation 
website. Your State, ST. INTEGRITY INVESTIGATION, http://www.stateintegrity.org/your_state (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2013). The analysis that follows relies on six questions under the Political Financing 
section of each state’s ranking. The rankings come from the Center for Public Integrity’s reading of 
what a small number of individuals (e.g., reporters, commission members, and watchdog groups) in 
each state believed to be the effectiveness or deficiencies of the different enforcement and oversight 
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metrics, but six questions asked of representatives in each state focused on the 
enforcement agency in charge of the state’s election laws. States were evaluated on 
a 0–100 scale on the perceived effectiveness of the enforcement agency in the 
initiation of investigations and assessment of fines for parties and candidates who 
violated state campaign finance laws, and for whether the agency audited party 
and candidate contribution and expenditure reports. For states with a “top dog” 
enforcer, the average score in the corresponding nineteen states was thirty-five. 
For states with an odd number of commission members, the average score was a 
much higher sixty-one. And for the nine states with an even number of 
commissioners, the average ranking was forty-eight.93 
This is suggestive of the potential benefits that might come from a structural 
change at the FEC. A word of caution, however: in reading the qualitative 
assessments of different state enforcement commissions (accessed in each state’s 
ranking) it is clear that states are often considered effective or ineffective as a 
consequence of different issues—available budgets, the campaign finance culture 
in the states, and the number of staff, all things that are independent of 
commission structure. Moreover, what some would argue in a state as evidence of 
effective enforcement (timely investigations of complaints from third parties), 
others in a different state might see as a weakness (the reliance on third party 
initiations of complaints over a random audit power).94 All told, however, the 
analysis of state regulatory models highlights not only the FEC’s unique 
establishment as an even number commission, but it also suggests that 
assessments of the FEC—the Center’s scores are probably best understood as 
“reputation” scores—might be improved were it to be a five- or seven-member 
board. This sort of comparison with state agencies is ripe for a more thorough 
investigation. 
VI. A FINAL WORD 
In the end, a qualitative and quantitative analysis of AOs is useful for a 
number of reasons. As noted, one sees both changes in the nature of questions 
raised by political actors, but also shifts in the evaluations of AOs. In particular, 
we see a notable and clear increase in conflict among commissioners, particularly 
conflict that leads to partisan deadlock.95 Ultimately, the real question is whether 
 
mechanisms. See About the State Integrity Investigation, ST. INTEGRITY INVESTIGATION, http:// 
www.stateintegrity.org/about (last visited Feb. 6, 2013). 
93. Data for each state is available from the author on request. The differences noted across 
states do not control statistically for each Commission’s budget or the means by which 
commissioners are appointed (e.g., by gubernatorial or legislative appointment). 
94. Indeed, the quantitative scores assigned to each state on each composite metric were 
based on the anecdotal insights offered by reporters, commission members, and watchdog groups in 
each state. See State Integrity Investigation Methodology FAQ, ST. INTEGRITY INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.stateintegrity.org/methodology (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
95. One reaction to some of the data offered here might be to minimize a focus on 
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we learn anything from these data about the ability of the FEC to offer guidance 
to candidates, parties, and interest groups. One view is that the FEC offers clear 
signals in most cases, even as the law has become more complicated and more 
background is necessary in offering such guidance (see Figures 2 and 3). On the 
other hand, the muddled guidance in more recent years is a sign that the FEC 
needs to change. Conflict and deadlocks send a signal that the law can be skirted, 
and with little likelihood of penalty after the fact. Of course, as the law develops in 
the context of judicial decision making and developments in technology, 
consensus is a lot to expect perhaps. The FEC has a tough job, and there is a lot 
of complexity and ambiguity in the law. It is worth remembering that a wholesale 
change in the FEC structure might bring with it unforeseen and unwanted 
complications. 
  
 
dissensions in voting by commissioners. One or two dissensions are not a concern so long as four 
votes are achieved for action. Moreover, four votes is itself a sign of bipartisan cooperation, if only 
minimal cooperation. Such a caveat is good one, though even a singular focus on deadlocks still 
reveals a troubling development in recent years at the FEC. 
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Appendix:  
 
Deadlocked Advisory Opinions96 
 
Advisory 
Opinion 
Sponsor Purpose 
1980-136 Candidate Candidate’s use of valuable donated artwork to settle 
or pay campaign debts owed to creditors 
1986-35 Candidate Corporate TV station’s offer of free, thirty-second 
commercial time slots to candidate’s campaign 
committee 
1986-43 Candidate Former candidate committee’s purchase of office and 
fund-raising services from corporation partly owned 
by same candidate 
1989-31 Candidate Application of California campaign finance statutes to 
a House candidate’s principal campaign committee 
1994-38 Candidate Application of California campaign finance statutes to 
a House candidate’s principal campaign committee 
2003-38 Candidate Use of campaign funds for redistricting activities 
2006-31 Candidate Rates for purchased ads
2008-02 Candidate Receipt of salary by former homemaker running for 
federal office 
2009-11 Candidate Use of funds for documentary
2009-17 Candidate Donation of campaign funds to charity
2009-25 Candidate Transfer of nonfederal funds to federal account 
2012-20 Candidate Definition of electioneering communication
1978-81 Group Unclear 
1980-13 Group Application of regulations to course in campaign 
management 
1980-15 Group Production and distribution of ads about voter 
registration and voting 
1980-66 Group Corporation use of comic character in public 
campaign to encourage voting and voter registration 
1982-43 Group Unclear
1984-04 Group Unclear
 
 
96. Source: Federal Election Commission. 
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Appendix (continued) 
 
Advisory 
Opinion 
Sponsor Purpose
1984-09 Group Unclear 
1985-36 Group Preparation and sale of political ads
1987-09 Group Ability to make independent expenditures for 
candidates it solicited contributions for 
1988-16 Group Political ads
1988-30 Group Corporate newsletter article explaining separate 
segregated fund and its importance 
1989-11 Group Establishment of PAC by a partnership
1989-23 Group Contribution “check-off” system to a PAC
1989-24 Group Ability of employees to wear PAC pin to promote 
solicitation 
1990-28 Group Use of telephone 900 lines to promote candidates 
1991-30 Group Grassroots lobbying and whether it qualifies as 
expenditures for elections 
1992-26 Group Donation of broadcast time to federal candidates 
1994-04 Group Question about partisan communications and 
solicitation 
1994-18 Group Definition of membership
1996-06 Group Solicitation to PAC of U.S. domestic subsidiary of a 
foreign corporation 
1997-24 Group Conversion of separate segregated fund into a 
nonconnected committee 
1998-06 Group Definition of restricted class for wholly owned 
domestic subsidiary of a foreign corporation 
2006-09 Group Acceptance of bundled contribution from partnership 
2007-25 Group Status of group as a corporation
2007-32 Group Political committee status of group
2007-35 Group Use of campaign funds for legal expenses of federal 
officeholder 
2009-03 Group Charitable matching program for contributions to 
PAC  
2009-28 Group Bundling
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Appendix (continued) 
 
Advisory 
Opinion 
Sponsor Purpose
2010-20 Group Fund raising by super PACs 
2011-09 Group Disclaimers on Facebook ads
2011-16 Group Repayment of loans
2011-23 Group Ads by super PACs
2012-01 Group Establishment of super PAC 
2012-08 Group Use of web platform for bundling
2012-24 Group LLC’s publication and marketing of candidate’s 
autobiography 
2012-29 Group Hosting events that will feature federal candidates 
2010-25 Group 
and 
Candidate 
Distribution of documentary 
2012-25 Group 
and 
Candidate 
Joint fund raising between a candidate and PAC, and 
between a regulated PAC and independent- 
expenditure-only PAC 
1979-45 Party Unclear 
1991-40 Party Status of joint-fund-raising committee
1992-39 Party Party coordinated expenditures in 1992 Georgia 
Senate general election run-off. 
1996-30 Party Independent expenditures for House and Senate 
candidates 
1996-32 Party Committee’s proposed transfer of certain funds from 
its nonfederal to its federal account 
 
 
